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The Constitutionality of Consumer Privacy
Regulation
Felix T. Wut

The increasing collection, aggregation, and use of consumer
data for commercial purposes have become sources of significant
concern among privacy scholars and advocates.' Tracking
companies, data brokers, and advertising networks collect
information about users' online activities and then package and
sell this information for use in targeted advertising. 2 Mobile
phone apps can collect and disseminate location information or
contact lists stored on the phone. 3 Retailers mine transaction
data looking for the customers who are most likely to be open to
marketing pitches-those who are newly pregnant, for example. 4
Pharmaceutical companies collect and use information about
doctors' drug prescriptions and their patients' medical histories
in order to better market drugs to those doctors. 5
The companies involved in this consumer data ecosystem
say that they are only trying to serve consumer needs better and
that much of what they do should raise no privacy concerns at
all because the data is attached to faceless numbers, not real
people.6 Many scholars, consumers, and regulators have been
significantly less sanguine about these practices. Scholars have
t Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Thank you to the staff of
the Legal Forum for organizing an excellent symposium and for helpful editing
suggestions, and to Randy Picker for thought-provoking comments as moderator of the
panel.
1 See generally Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the
InformationAge (NYU 2006).
2 See Julia Angwin, The Web's New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, Wall St J W1 (July
30, 2010).
3 See Scott Thurm and Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps Are Watching You, Wall
St J Cl (Dec 18, 2010).
4 See Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, NY Times Magazine 30, 33 (Feb 19,
2012).
s See Katie Thomas, Data Trove on Doctors Guides Drug Company Pitches, NY
Times B1 (May 17, 2013).
6 See, for example, Angwin, The Web's New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, Wall St
J at
W1 (cited in note 2).
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argued that the consumer data trade threatens to undermine
individuals' control over their own data and thus undermine
individuals' ability to function in a world in which choices are
increasingly determined by data. 7 Other scholars have argued
that these practices threaten the construction of selfhood, 8 may
chill intellectual exploration,9 or may lead to blackmail,
harassment, and other more concrete harms. 0 Consumers
themselves appear to be uneasy with practices such as online
tracking and targeted advertising." One study found that 66
percent of those surveyed did not want to receive any
advertising tailored to them, and a further 18 percent objected
to having their advertising tailored on the basis of their
activities on websites other than the one they were visiting.12
Perhaps in response to such scholarly warnings and consumer
sentiment, both the Obama Administration and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) have recently focused attention on
protecting consumer privacy and have explicitly recognized its
importance. 13

See Solove, The Digital Person at 38-41 (cited in note 1).
See Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of
Everyday Practice 127-52 (Yale 2012); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 Harv L
Rev 1904, 1910-11 (2013).
9 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 Harv L Rev 1934, 194552 (2013).
1o See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the SurprisingFailure
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L Rev 1701, 1748 (2010) (expressing concern about "a
hypothetical database of ruin," containing harmful information about every person,
which has "until now [been] splintered across dozens of databases on computers around
the world," but which is increasingly coming "together into one, giant, database-in-thesky"). Moreover, depending on how one conceptualizes the privacy harms that these data
practices cause, the practices may cause privacy problems even if particular pieces of
data cannot be connected to specific, identified individuals. See generally Felix T. Wu,
Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U Colo L Rev 1117 (2013).
n See Joseph Turow, et al, Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three
Activities That Enable It (Social Science Research Network Working Paper, Sept 2009),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1478214 (visited Sept 15,
2013).
12 Id at 15.
13 See The White
House, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A
Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital
Economy 1 (Feb 2012), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacyfinal.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("Strong consumer data privacy protections are essential
to maintaining consumers' trust in the technologies and companies that drive the digital
economy."); Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid
Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers 7-8 (Mar 2012), online at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("There
was broad consensus among commenters that consumers need basic privacy protections
8
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The existing approaches to addressing consumer privacy
concerns have largely revolved around the principle of "noticeand-choice," that is, giving consumers notice of what information
will be collected and how it will be used and allowing consumers
to choose whether to proceed with the transaction. 14 Notice-andchoice, however, has been heavily criticized, with many pointing
out the deficiencies of notice, the difficulty of exercising real
choice, or both.' 5 Privacy policies are the standard form of notice,
but it would take an unreasonable amount of time for the
average consumer simply to skim the privacy policies of the
websites he or she visits, let alone comprehend or weigh them. 16
Even if consumers could know perfectly what will happen to
their data in an immediate transaction, it is virtually impossible
for them to assess the long-term effects of that transaction on
their privacy.1 7 Online services may also exhibit network effects
or otherwise have characteristics that make it more difficult for
consumers unhappy with a company's privacy policies to move to
a competitor. 18

Critics of the notice-and-choice status quo have pushed for
something stronger, with proposals generally falling into one of
two categories. First, some scholars have focused on improving
the notice given to consumers, pushing for forms of notice that
would in fact be more likely to be noticed. 19 Going beyond
traditional forms of notice, these "super-notices" potentially
leverage the same cognitive features of consumers that
undermine traditional notice. Second, others have advocated at
model with
least supplementing the notice-and-choice

for their personal information.").
14 See Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 Minn L Rev 907, 929
(2013).
15 See, for example, Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and
the Consent Dilemma, 126 Harv L Rev 1880, 1883-93 (2013); Solon Barocas and Helen
Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent (unpublished paper,
2006), online at http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/ED S11 OnNotice.pdf
(visited Sept 15, 2013). See also Ohm, 97 Minn L Rev at 930-31 (cited in note 14).
1* See Aleecia M. McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, 4 I/S J L & Pol 543, 563 (2008) (estimating that it would take the average
individual 154 hourslyear to skim the privacy policies of the websites he or she visits).
17 See Solove, 126 Harv L Rev at 1889-91 (cited in note 15).
1s See Oren Bracha and Frank A. Pasquale 1II, Federal Search Commission?Access,
Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 Cornell L Rev 1149, 1180-83
(2008).
19 See Part I.A.
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substantive restrictions on the collection and/or sharing of
consumer data.20
Both types of proposals face potential arguments that they
run afoul of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech. 21 Substantive restrictions on the sharing of consumer
data seem to be restrictions on the ability of one willing
speaker-one data collector or broker-to speak to a willing
listener. 22 Such restrictions might be problematic even if they
could be overcome with the consent of the consumer. 23
Mandating particular forms of notice to be given to consumers
who provide data might be a form of impermissibly compelled
speech. 24
Although at first glance heightened First Amendment
scrutiny would seem to apply to these types of privacy
regulations, that superficially straightforward view should be
rejected. What the straightforward view misses is the fact that
the relevant "speakers," and sometimes "listeners," in the
consumer data ecosystem are commercial entities. That crucial
fact distinguishes super-notice requirements imposed on those
entities or restrictions on data brokerage among those entities
from similar restrictions imposed on individuals. Super-notice
requirements imposed on commercial entities do not infringe
any speech interests because they implicate neither the freedom
of conscience interests that lie at the heart of the compelled
speech cases, nor the listener interests that lie at the heart of
the commercial speech cases. Similarly, restrictions on data
processing and sharing among commercial entities do not
infringe any speech interests because none of the parties to
20 See Solove, 126 Harv L Rev at 1903 (cited in note 15); Barocas and
Nissenbaum,
On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent at 6 (cited in note 15).
21 Of course, the First Amendment would only apply to laws mandating
particular
disclosures or restricting particular information flows, rather than guidelines published
to encourage companies to adopt either disclosures or restrictions as best practices. See,
for example, Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of
Rapid Change at iii (cited in note 13) ("To the extent the framework goes beyond existing
legal requirements, the framework is not intended to serve as a template for law
enforcement actions or regulations under laws currently enforced by the FTC."). The
focus of this Article is on the First Amendment implications of mandatory regimes.
22 See Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, 131 S Ct 2653, 2667 (2011) ("This Court has held
that the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the
First Amendment.").
23 See id at 2668-69.
2
See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87
Notre Dame L Rev 1027, 1068-71 (2012).
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those transactions should be regarded as having relevant First
Amendment interests. These particular distinctions remain
valid even if one were to believe that in other contexts corporate
or commercial speech should be fully protected under the First
Amendment. 25
Part I below elaborates on why imposing a super-notice
requirement on a commercial data collector should not trigger
heightened First Amendment scrutiny under the compelled
speech line of cases. Part II explains why restricting data
transfers among commercial entities also should not trigger
heightened First Amendment scrutiny. Part III briefly
summarizes and concludes.
I. PRIVACY "SUPER-NOTICES" AND THE PROBLEM OF
COMPELLED SPEECH

Scholars and regulators have been interested recently in
finding ways to improve the privacy notices that consumers
receive. Mandating improved notice, however, has the potential
to trigger heightened First Amendment scrutiny as a form of
compelled speech, especially when the mandate takes a form
that can be characterized as steering consumers toward greater
privacy protection. Such scrutiny is not in fact warranted, as
consumer privacy mandates are directed at commercial entities,
which do not experience the same violation of freedom of
conscience that individuals do when compelled to speak.
A.

Crafting Better Privacy Notices

The principle of notice-and-choice has been the primary
mode of consumer privacy protection in the United States. 26 The
idea is that companies that collect and use consumer data will
tell consumers about the companies' data practices, and
consumers can then make an informed choice about whether to

25 For an example of the view that corporate and commercial speech should be
fully
protected under the First Amendment, see Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First
Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination,41 Loyola
LA L Rev 67, 73 (2007) ("[E]ach of the categorical bases for reducing or rejecting First
Amendment protection for commercial speech is, in one way or another, appropriately
characterized as a form of invidious and constitutionally impermissible viewpoint
discrimination."); id at 86-87 (rejecting First Amendment distinctions based on the
"corporate nature of the speaker").
2r See Ohm, 97 Minn L Rev at 929 (cited
in note 14).
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transact with these companies or to forgo such transactions and
perhaps seek out other companies instead. In some sectors, such
as financial services, the law mandates certain privacy
disclosures.27 In other areas, where affirmative disclosures are
not always required, the focus, through FTC enforcement, has
instead been on ensuring that whatever disclosures are made
are truthful, 28 or sometimes on ensuring that consumers receive
notice of data practices that would violate their expectations. 29
The effectiveness of notice-and-choice has been criticized on
a number of fronts. Some scholars have pointed out the lack of
real choice.30 Many others have focused on the inadequacy of
notice. 31 Traditional privacy policies are almost uniformly
regarded as too long, too complex, and too confusing to
consumers. 32
Despite its flaws though, notice-and-choice appears strongly
entrenched in American law. It has remained a core feature of
the FTC's reports on consumer privacy. 33 It has also been the
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub L No 106-102, 113 Stat 1338 (1999), codified
at
15 USC § 6803. Similarly, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule requires most covered entities to provide notice to individuals of
the uses and disclosures that the entity may make of the individual's protected health
information. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub L No 104191, 110 Stat 1936 (1996), codified in various sections of Title 18, 26, 29, and 42.
28 See Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining
Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 San Diego L Rev 809,
815-16 (2011).
29 See, for example, Complaint, In re Sears Holdings Management Corp, Doc No C4264, *5 (FTC filed Aug 31, 2009), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/
090604searscmpt.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
so See notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
31 See Ohm, 97 Minn L Rev at 930 (cited in note 14).
32 See id at 930-31; Federal Trade Commission, Protecting
Consumer Privacy in an
Era of Rapid Change at 61 (cited in note 13) ('The preliminary staff report highlighted
the consensus among roundtable participants that most privacy policies are generally
ineffective for informing consumers about a company's data practices because they are
too long, are difficult to comprehend, and lack uniformity."). See also McDonald and
Cranor, 4 I/S J L & Pol at 565 (cited in note 16) ("Nationally, if Americans were to read
online privacy policies word-for-word, we estimate the value of time lost as about $781
billion annually."); Joseph Turow, et al, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer
Privacy in the Coming Decade, 3 IIS J L & Pol 723, 725-26 (2007-08) (concluding that
"[w]ithout a baseline set of information practices, the term 'privacy policy' is confusing to
the consumer," and that "[tihe lack of common disclosure language undermines
consumers' ability to 'shop for privacy"').
3
See Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid
Change at vii-viii (cited in note 13) (endorsing as two of the baseline principles of its
consumer privacy framework that companies processing consumer data "should increase
the transparency of their data practices" and that they "should simplify consumer
choice"). See also Federal Trade Commission, Mobile Privacy Disclosures:Building Trust
27
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focus of California law and enforcement actions by the California
Attorney General. 34 It is also normatively attractive because it
avoids a one-size-fits-all approach to privacy and potentially
opens the space for companies to serve consumers'
heterogeneous privacy preferences differently. 35
Recently, a number of privacy scholars have tried to
resuscitate some form of notice-and-choice by seeking to improve
the notice that consumers receive. Ryan Calo has argued that
"visceral notice"-notice that is more experiential than textualmay succeed where traditional textual notice has failed. 36 Cab0
describes three different enhanced notice strategies. One is to
leverage existing consumer knowledge in order to convey
information more efficiently: a shutter sound, for example,
effectively warns bystanders that a digital picture is being
taken.3 7 Another is to build on widely shared psychological
responses: user interfaces with anthropomorphic features or
that are more formal induce more caution on the part of users
disclosing personal information. 38 A third is to personalize the
information that each individual receives: this is the concept
behind privacy "dashboards," which show how an individual's
information is being used. 39
In this volume, Bill McGeveran argues that an appropriate
level of "friction" should be introduced in sharing, so that it is
not "easier to 'share' an action online than to do it."40 For
example, rather than allowing users' general acknowledgement
of a privacy policy to constitute consent to sharing their media
playlists, McGeveran advocates consent on a per-action basis,
such as by having a "Play and Share" button alongside each
Through Transparency 6 (Feb 2013), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/
130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013) (summarizing "three core
principles" from its March 2012 Privacy Report: "Privacy by Design," "Simplified
Consumer Choice," and "Greater Transparency," and reaffirming that "all three of these
principles apply to mobile companies").
3 See California Online Privacy Protection Act, Cal Bus & Prof Code §§ 22575-79;
Office of Attorney General of California, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Notifies
Mobile App Developers of Non-Compliance with California Privacy Law (Oct 30, 2012),
online
at
http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harrisnotifies-mobile-app-developers-non-compliance (visited Sept 15, 2013).
5 See Calo, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1048-49 (cited in note 24).
'6

3

See id at 1057-58.

See id at 1035-37.
3 See id at 1038-39.
3 See Calo, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1041-44 (cited in note 24).
4o See William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U Chi Legal F 15, 18.
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"Play" button.4 ' Such a strategy ensures a kind of additional
notice at each moment of sharing.
Paul Ohm goes further, arguing that companies should be
required to tie their trademarks to core privacy commitments, so
that if a company wants to renege on one of those commitments,
it would also have to change its trademark. 42 As Ohm conceives
of his proposal, the goal is to use the trademark change as a
strong signal of a privacy "lurch," 43 alerting consumers to a
significant shift in privacy policies in a way that is uniquely
powerful. 44 In this scheme, trademarks are the ultimate form of
notice, capable of "convey[ing] meaning in an efficient and
compact form," and so prominent that "no consumer will fail to
notice when a trademark changes." 45
Regulators have also been thinking about how to improve
the effectiveness of notice. For example, in January 2013, the
Office of the Attorney General of California issued a report on
mobile privacy. 46 Among the report's recommendations was that
app developers use "enhanced measures," including "special
notices," in order to supplement a general privacy policy and
better alert users to potentially unexpected or sensitive data
collection. 47 While the California report was not particularly
specific on how to design special notices, 48 it does evidence a
growing recognition that real disclosure may require something
more than statements in a privacy policy. The FTC has also
shown an interest in measuring and enhancing the effectiveness

41 Id at 62-64.
42 See Ohm, 97 Minn L Rev at 911-13 (cited
in note 14).
43 Ohm's proposal focuses on "the sudden privacy shift, which some have called the
'privacy lurch."' Id at 909, quoting James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 Iowa L
Rev 1137, 1200-01 (2009).
4
See Ohm, 97 Minn L Rev at 950 ("On the Internet, the trademark itself ... sits
perhaps on the only place where an effective warning label can appear. No other place on
a website is as likely to be seen and noticed.").
4s Id at 939-40.
46 Office of the Attorney General of California, Privacy on the Go: Recommendations
for the Mobile Ecosystem 1 (Jan 2013), online at http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/
privacy/privacy-on-thego.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
47 See id at 12.
4
See id (explaining that app developers should "[dieliver special notices in context,
in many cases just before the specific data are to be collected," should "[e]xplain the
intended uses and any third parties to whom user data would be disclosed," should
"[plrovide an easy way for users to choose whether or not to allow the collection or use of
the data," and should "[i] nclude a link to the general privacy policy, if feasible").
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of notice. 49 The guidelines proposed by regulators have thus far
not been nearly as radical as some of the academic proposals,
and they have not been mandatory, but regulators have signaled
a willingness to look to the academic literature for future
guidance.5 0
What ties all of these strategies together is their emphasis
on the form of the notice, and not just its content. These
strategies are designed to take ostensibly the same
information-that a company will process particular data in a
particular way-and convey the information in a manner that
will induce consumers to take notice, or to convey it at a time
when consumers will be more likely to act upon the information.
The strategies "breathe a little life back into notice-and-choice"5 1
by amping up the notice into a kind of "super-notice," one that
not only makes the information available, but makes it stand
out.
First Amendment Objections to Super-Notice

B.

The move from notices to super-notices, however, has the
potential to trigger heightened scrutiny under the First
Amendment. Many laws and regulatory schemes-from
mandatory ingredient lists on food and drug packaging to
corporate disclosure laws-compel the disclosure of factual
information without attracting First Amendment comment,
much less First Amendment scrutiny. 52 By mandating the form
of the disclosure, however, and not just its content, supernotices, particularly of the form advocated by some academics,
could be challenged as inevitably conveying a normative
viewpoint and going beyond the purely factual disclosures that
have previously resisted First Amendment challenges.
Consider the DC Circuit's ruling in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co v Food and Drug Administration,53 in which the court struck
down new visual "warnings" that the Food and Drug

4

See Federal Trade Commission, Mobile Privacy Disclosures at 1 (cited in note 33).
5 See id at 27-28.
5' See Ohm, 97 Minn L Rev at 911 (cited in note 14).
52 See, for example, Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv L Rev 1765, 1778-79
(2004) (describing federal securities regulation as "residing almost imperceptibly outside
the First Amendment's boundaries," including with respect to "compelled speech").
53 696 F3d 1205 (DC Cir 2012).
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Administration (FDA) mandated for cigarette packages. 54 The
FDA had determined that the existing warnings were
inadequate because "(1) [t]hey have not changed in more than 25
years, (2) they often go unnoticed, and (3) they fail to convey
relevant information in an effective manner."55 As a result, the
agency decided to mandate the use of new "larger, graphic
warnings" that would "communicate the health risks of smoking
more effectively."5 6 The agency's final rule "require[d] each
cigarette package and advertisement to bear one of nine new
textual warning statements" and also "specifie[d] the color
graphic images that must accompany each of the nine new
textual warning statements." 5 7
The cigarette companies did not challenge the textual
statements but did challenge the graphics that went with them.
The DC Circuit ultimately held that the part of the FDA rule
mandating the graphics violated the First Amendment because
it compelled commercial speech and failed intermediate
scrutiny.5 8 The court rejected the application of the less
stringent Zauderer standard, under which "'purely factual and
uncontroversial' disclosures are permissible if they are
'reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing
deception of consumers,' provided the requirements are not
'unjustified or unduly burdensome."'5 9 The court emphasized
that "the graphic warnings do not constitute the type of 'purely
information, or 'accurate
factual and uncontroversial'
statement[s],' to which the Zauderer standard may be applied." 60
The court reasoned that because the FDA was trying to "evoke
an emotional response, or, at most, shock the viewer into
retaining the information in the text warning," the images fell
outside the realm of "purely factual" information.6 1
Privacy super-notices could be regarded as closely analogous
in this way to the graphical cigarette warnings struck down in
" Id at 1217.
ss Food and Drug Administration, Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements, 76 Fed Reg 36628, 36631 (June 22, 2011) (amending 21 CFR Part 1141).
* Id at 36631.
5' Id at 36628.
8 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F3d at 1222.
59 Id at 1212, quoting Zauderer v Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 US 626, 651 (1985).
6
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F3d at 1216, quoting Zauderer, 471 US at 651.
61 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F3d at 1216-17.
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R.J. Reynolds. Visceral forms of privacy notice, such as
anthropomorphic interfaces, "draw [ ] upon consumer psychology
to achieve greater salience," just as the FDA was trying to do
with its graphical warnings. 62 If Congress were to require that
"each advertising network on the Internet had an avatar that
ran onto the bottom of the screen to denote the fact that the
network was following the user,"63 such a requirement could also
be characterized as designed to "evoke an emotional response" in
order to make the fact of tracking more salient, and perhaps to
make the tracking seem more undesirable to the consumer.
The cigarette warning case cannot be distinguished as a
case of impermissible persuasion. Perhaps it is true that the
FDA was "straying too far from the central goal of notice, which
is better information," and was instead trying "to frighten
current and potential smokers." 64 If So, though, the difference
between
mandating graphical cigarette
warnings and
mandating privacy super-notice is one of degree and not of kind.
True, none of the proposed privacy super-notices is nearly as
gruesome as the cigarette warnings, and in that sense, privacy
super-notices are not exactly frightening. But while the R.J.
Reynolds court did characterize the images as "inflammatory," 65
it seems ultimately to have based its reasoning on the graphical
warnings conveying "the state's subjective-and perhaps even
ideological-view," 66 rather than being "an unbiased source of
information." 67 The problem with the graphical warnings was
that they conveyed the one-sided message that cigarette
smoking is bad.
Just as with cigarette warnings, privacy super-notices are
also inevitably one-sided. They are designed to make consumers
take notice and consider whether to avoid or drop an
information service that they would otherwise use. The
trademark modification that Ohm advocates, for example, is
supposed to "alert [] the consumer to the heightened risk to
privacy" from a privacy lurch. 68 It applies when a company

62
63

Ca0, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1070 (cited in note 24).
Id at 1040.

Id at 1070.
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F3d at 1216.
* Id at 1212.
" Id at 1216.
6
Ohm, 97 Minn L Rev at 950 (cited in note 14) (emphasis added).
64

6
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wants to eliminate a core privacy promise, not when it wants to
enhance its customers' privacy. 69 To the extent to which supernotice is about trying "to ensure consumers have the correct
mental model of the product or service,"70 its efforts are aimed at
only one side of the equation, namely the privacy risks of the
service in question, rather than its potential benefits. Indeed,
the one-sidedness might be even more problematic for privacy
super-notices than for cigarette warnings, given that the
benefits of data sharing might be both real and not entirely
obvious to the user.
Even a relatively innocuous mandate about the timing of
notice, such as a requirement to have a "Play and Share"
button,7 1 can be characterized as a form of normative speech.
Intentionally or not, mandating disclosures that highlight a
consumer's privacy choices conveys the message that "this
information" and "this choice" are important. One of the key
reasons to deploy super-notice is precisely to call attention to
privacy choices that will otherwise not receive enough
attention. 72 Doing so signals that the privacy choice is
important, or at least more important than the user may have
previously thought it to be. Moreover, against a status quo in
which most information is collected and used without enhanced
notice, selecting particular privacy moments for special
treatment can signal the importance of the particular moments
chosen.
None of this is to suggest that privacy super-notices and
cigarette warnings are completely indistinguishable, or that
super-notices are as ends driven as the graphical cigarette
warnings perhaps were. 3 Perhaps the R.J. Reynolds case will
turn out to be an outlier, one driven by the FDA's failure more
consistently to characterize its strategy as a notice strategy and

69

Id at

944.

Calo, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1070 (cited in note 24).
71 See note 41 and accompanying
text.
71 See McGeveran, 2013 U Chi Legal F at 64 (cited in note 40)
(arguing that a
benefit of introducing friction into the act of sharing is that it adds an "instant of extra
thought" that is "necessary to secure genuine consent").
7
See Calo, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1070 (cited in note 24) ("[Tjhe FDA justified its
new rules not by reference to what the consumer would understand about the risks of
smoking, but by reference to the impact the images had on cigarette consumption in
other jurisdictions where graphic warnings were already in place.").
70
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to cabin its approach accordingly. 74 In any event, courts will
need to make some distinction between graphical cigarette
warnings and traditional consumer product warnings if they
intend to save the latter from scrutiny. If the R.J. Reynolds case,
however, signals that the key distinction in determining the
level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled speech requirement is
between normative speech and purely factual information,
privacy super-notices may end up falling on the heightened
scrutiny side of that line.
One might attempt to justify privacy super-notice by
conceding that it is subject to heightened scrutiny, but arguing
that it meets such scrutiny. Having to satisfy heightened
scrutiny, however, places a serious burden on the state to justify
the privacy interests at stake. For example, in the case of
InternationalDairy Foods Association v Amestoy, 75 the Second
Circuit overturned a Vermont law mandating the disclosure of
the use of bovine growth hormones (rBST) in dairy cows, finding
that the state failed to establish a substantial interest in the
disclosure and thus that the law failed intermediate scrutiny.7 6
In that case, the court rejected as a substantial interest "the
demand of [Vermont's] citizenry for such information," and while
the court was "sympathetic to the Vermont consumers who wish
to know which products may derive from rBST-treated herds," it
found such a desire "insufficient" to justify the compelled
speech.7 7 What Vermont failed to do was to show scientific
evidence of health or safety concerns with rBST-treated cows. 78
If the same reasoning were applied to privacy super-notice,
the government would presumably need to show real evidence of
privacy harm from the data practices at issue. Consumers'
subjective concerns and their desire to protect their own privacy
would presumably be regarded as insufficient. Of course, the
companies collecting, sharing, and using consumer data deny
that their practices cause any objective privacy harms. 79
Moreover, in the context of data breaches, some courts have
74 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F3d at 1216 (noting that "many of the images do not
convey any warning information at all," such as "the images of a woman crying, a small
child, and the man wearing a T-shirt emblazoned with the words 'I QUIT"').
7
92 F3d 67 (2d Cir 1996).
76 Id at 73.
7
Id at 73-74.
78 Id at 73.
7
See note 6 and accompanying text.
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found that plaintiffs whose data was breached, but not further
misused (such as for identity theft), did not suffer an injury
sufficient to confer Article III standing.8 0 Cases such as these
suggest the potential difficulty of demonstrating that the
consumer data trade causes objective harms in the absence of
disclosures to criminals. They consequently suggest that the
government may not be able to meet a heightened burden to
justify mandatory super-notice. While the International Dairy
Foods ruling may well have been a narrow one driven by the
state's failure to provide better evidence of its legitimate
interests,8 1 the case nevertheless demonstrates the difference
that heightened scrutiny can make to the outcome.
Answering the First Amendment Objections

C.

Privacy regulators may be able to successfully walk the fine
line between compelling the disclosure of factual information
and compelling normative speech. In the context of compelling
commercial entities to more effectively highlight privacy choices,
however, they should not be required to do so. The key
distinction is not between the factual and the normative, but
between commercial and noncommercial entities. Because the
rationales for scrutinizing compelled speech are generally only
applicable to individuals, the government should have far
greater leeway to compel speech from commercial entities under
the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision in Zauderer v Office of

Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio82 supports
the view that commerciality is crucial in determining the level of
scrutiny to apply to a compelled speech requirement. 83 In
Zauderer, an attorney challenged a disciplinary action against
him that was based, among other things, on an advertisement in
which he stated that he took cases on a contingency fee basis
and that if the client did not recover, she would owe "no legal

a

See, for example, Reilly v Ceridian Corp, 664 F3d 38, 42 (3d Cir 2011).

8' See National Electrical Manufacturers Association v Sorrell, 272 F3d 104, 115 n 6
(2d Cir 2001) (noting that the decision in International Dairy Foods "was expressly
limited to cases in which a state disclosure requirement is supported by no interest other
than the gratification of 'consumer curiosity"').
82 471 US 626 (1985).
8

See id at 651.
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fees." 8 4 The ad failed to disclose that the client would still be
liable for costs. 8 5 In rejecting heightened scrutiny of the
disclosure requirement, the Court relied on the rationale that
"the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the
information such speech provides."8 6 Disclosure requirements
advance the goal of disseminating valuable information, rather
than inhibiting it. Thus, the Court characterized the attorney's
"interest in not providing any particular factual information in
his advertising" as "minimal."
It is true that the Court in Zauderer also appeared to place
weight on the fact that the speech being compelled was "purely
factual and uncontroversial."8 8 Nothing about the Court's
rationale for permitting greater leeway for compelled speech in
the commercial context, however, relied on that characterization
of the speech at issue. If the goal is disseminating information of
"value to consumers," that goal can also be advanced by
disseminating information that is not "purely factual."
Moreover, the caveat of limiting its holding to "purely
factual" information can be explained by the way that the Court
characterized the First Amendment interest in the case. While
the Court rejected the view that "disclosure requirements do not
implicate the advertiser's First Amendment rights at all," it did
so as part of "recogniz[ing] that unjustified or unduly
burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First
Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech."8 9 In other
words, the compelled speech itself was not the problem. The
problem was that the compulsion was a condition of other
speech, in this case attorney advertising, and that other speech
might be burdened or chilled by such a condition. 90 If a
commercial speaker decides to remain silent in order to avoid

87

Id at 631.
Id at 633.
Zauderer, 471 US at 651.
Id.

8

Id.

8

5

8

89 Id (emphasis added).

9 See Zauderer, 471 US at 650 ("In requiring attorneys who advertise their
willingness to represent clients on a contingent-fee basis to state that the client may
have to bear certain expenses even if he loses, Ohio has not attempted to prevent
attorneys from conveying information to the public; it has only required them to provide
somewhat more information than they might otherwise be inclined to present.").
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particular compelled speech, then listeners have been denied the
value of that speech and the disclosure requirement may indeed
warrant greater scrutiny. In the context of determining whether
compelled speech burdens other speech, it may well make sense
to distinguish between compelling factual and normative speech;
speakers who are required to espouse a normative view they
disagree with as a condition of speaking may be more readily
silenced than speakers who are required to disclose only true
factual information.
Unlike a regulation of advertising, privacy super-notice
requirements are not likely to be framed in ways that burden
other expression, because any requirement to speak arises not
as a condition of other speech, but as a condition of commercial
conduct. A requirement to deploy privacy super-notices would
presumably attach to the provision of particular data services,
not the advertising of those services or other similar speech.
Thus, the concern in Zauderer of "chilling protected commercial
speech" would not apply, which supports expanding the class of
commercial compelled speech to which only minimal scrutiny
applies beyond the "purely factual."9 1
Courts that have applied heightened scrutiny to commercial
compelled speech have tended to assume that heightened
scrutiny is the baseline to which Zauderer is an exception. 92
That baseline is the result of a simple syllogism: (1) the First
Amendment applies some level of heightened scrutiny to
commercial speech; (2) the First Amendment applies equally to
restricting or compelling speech; and (3) therefore, the First
Amendment scrutiny that applies to restricting commercial
speech must also apply to compelling it.
The flaw in the syllogism is in failing to recognize how the
cases and rationales that support the first point intersect, or fail
to intersect, with the cases and rationales that support the
second point. As described in Zauderer, heightened scrutiny for
commercial speech is focused on protecting the listeners'
interests.9 3 The prohibition on compelled speech, however,

derives from cases like West Virginia State Board of Education v

"'

Id at 651.

9 See, for example, R.J. Reynolds, 696 F3d at 1212 ("Courts have recognized a
handful of 'narrow and well-understood exceptions' to the general rule that contentbased speech regulations-including compelled speech-are subject to strict scrutiny.").
9
See note 86 and accompanying text.
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Barnette,94 and Wooley v Maynard.95 These cases dealt with
compulsions against individuals and focused on the "individual
freedom of mind" and the right of individuals not to speak,
rather than on any interests of the listeners.9 6 Thus, while
commercial speech restrictions are scrutinized to protect
listeners, compelled speech requirements are scrutinized to
protect speakers, and neither rationale seems to apply in the
context of commercial compelled speech.
There are a handful of Supreme Court cases involving
compelled speech in the commercial context that are regularly
cited for the proposition that heightened scrutiny applies to such
compulsions.9 7 In reality, however, these cases provide scant
support for heightened scrutiny, and they fail to establish a
general equivalence between noncommercial and commercial
compelled speech.

In Pacific Gas & Electric Co u Public Utilities Commission
98 the Court held that a privately owned utility
of California,
company could not be compelled to include materials from
another organization in its billing envelopes. 99 No opinion in
that case commanded a majority of the Court, and the pivotal
fifth vote was provided by Justice Marshall, who, concurring
only in the judgment, emphasized that the compulsion in that
case came "at the expense of [the utility's] ability to use the
property in question as a forum for the exercise of its own First
Amendment rights."10 0 That is, during the four months in which
the other organization was given access, the utility could only
disseminate its own views by paying additional postage.10 1
this
as
the
State's
Marshall
characterized
Justice
"appropriating, four times a year, the space in appellant's
envelope that appellant would otherwise use for its own speech,"
thereby "necessarily curtail[ing] appellant's use of its own

319 US 624 (1943).
430 US 705 (1977).
9 Barnette, 319 US at 637; Wooley, 430 US at 714.
9
See, for example, R.J. Reynolds, 696 F3d at 1211, citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co
v Public Utilities Commission of California, 475 US 1, 16 (1986) and United States v
United Foods, Inc, 533 US 405, 410-11 (2001).
9
475 US 1 (1986).
9
See id at 4, 7 (plurality). See also id at 21-26 (Marshall concurring in the
judgment).
100 Id at 23-24 (Marshall concurring in the judgment).
94
9

101 See id at 6 (plurality).
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forum."102 Thus, it was again the potential effect of the
regulation in restricting the corporation's own speech, rather
than the regulation's compelling speech, that formed the basis
for the Court's decision in the case.
Moreover, as in Zauderer, even after concluding that there
was a valid speech interest in this case, Justice Marshall did not
apply anything like intermediate or strict scrutiny to the
regulation at issue. Characterizing the "interference with
appellant's speech" as "very slight," Justice Marshall held that
the State had failed to justify "even that minor burden" and that
its asserted interest in exposing utility customers to a variety of
views was simply illegitimate. 103 Together with the three
dissenters then, 104 Justice Marshall declined to apply the
scrutiny that would otherwise apply to compelling individuals to
speak. 105 The PG&E case thus cannot be read to have
established heightened scrutiny for commercial compelled
speech.106

The case of United States v United Foods, Inc,107 is similarly
insufficient to support the view that commercial compelled
speech is subject to heightened scrutiny.1 0 8 In that case, the
Court struck down a scheme whereby mushroom producers were
required to fund generic mushroom advertising.109 The Court did
so, however, primarily on the basis of a line of cases involving
compelled association and the permissible uses of compelled
contributions to those associations. 110 What the Court seems to

Pacific Gas & Electric Co, 475 US at 24 (Marshall concurring in the judgment).
Id at 24-25 (Marshall concurring in the judgment).
104 See id at 26 (Rehnquist dissenting) ("Nor do I believe that negative free speech
rights, applicable to individuals and perhaps the print media, should be extended to
corporations generally.").
105 See id at 25 (Marshall concurring in the judgment)
("I do not mean to suggest
that I would hold, contrary to our precedents, that the corporation's First Amendment
rights are coextensive with those of individuals.").
'os Four members of the Court joined the plurality opinion. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co, 475 US at 4. Justice Blackmun did not participate in the case. Id at 21.
102
103

10

533 US 405 (2001).

'8

Id at 408.

10 Id at 408-09.
110 See id at 413. The Court stated:
It is true that the party who protests the assessment here is required simply to
support speech by others, not to utter the speech itself. We conclude, however,
that the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set
forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object
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have found objectionable was compelling mushroom producers to
associate with each other for the sole purpose of advertising."n If
the compelled association had been otherwise justifiable, the
Court suggested the compelled contributions for advertising
would have been as well. 112 Thus, it is difficult to read United
Foods as applying outside the realm of compelled associations.
More importantly, the later case of Johanns v Livestock

Marketing Association,113 has severely undercut the precedential
value of United Foods. 114 Livestock Marketing upheld a
regulatory scheme virtually identical to the one at issue in
United Foods under the theory that the advertising at issue was
government speech, for which compelled subsidies do not attract
heightened scrutiny.1 1 5 That argument had been unavailable in
United Foods only because the government had waived it by
failing to argue it in the court below.11 6 Had the government
argued that point in United Foods, the result likely would have
been the same as in Livestock Marketing: compelled
subsidization of this type of generic product advertising raises
no significant First Amendment concerns.1 17 United Foods thus
does not support heightened scrutiny of commercial compelled
speech.
Finally, cases involving the corporate media also do not
necessarily support extending similar protections to commercial

entities generally. In Miami Herald PublishingCo v Tornillo,118
for example, the Court struck down a Florida statute that
required newspapers to print a reply from any political

to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by
law or necessity.
Id.
nl See United Foods, 533 US at 415 ("[T]he compelled contributions for advertising
are not part of some broader regulatory scheme. The only program the Government
contends the compelled contributions serve is the very advertising scheme in question.").
112 See id at 414-15 (distinguishing the case of Glickman v Wileman Brothers &
Elliott, Ic, 521 US 457 (1997), as a case in which "producers were bound together in the
common venture," thereby justifying "the imposition upon their First Amendment rights
caused by using compelled contributions for germane advertising").
113 544 US 550 (2005).
11

See generally id.

Id at 559.
See United Foods, 533 US at 416-17.
117 See Livestock Marketing, 544 US at 560 (finding the advertising
at issue to be the
type of government speech that is "not susceptible to First Amendment challenge").
11

116

118 418 US 241 (1974).
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candidate criticized by a newspaper editorial. 119 The Court's
decision, however, was driven at least in part by the concern
that the Florida mandate would chill the newspaper's own
speech, because the paper might tend to avoid criticisms that
would potentially trigger the right of reply. 120 Because media
companies are in the business of selling fully-protected speech,
compelling such companies to speak almost inevitably has the
potential to chill or burden speech, and thus is more akin to a
compulsion conditioned on speech than a compulsion conditioned
on commercial conduct. 12 1 Cases involving media companies
cannot be generalized to other commercial entities.
Thus, none of the cases usually relied upon to establish an
interest at stake in commercial compelled speech in fact show
that there is anything like the interests at stake when
individuals are compelled to speak or when commercial speech is
restricted. Privacy super-notices, as a form of commercial
compelled speech, should receive little First Amendment
scrutiny because they involve a type of speech that implicates
neither the listener interests at stake in commercial speech
restrictions nor the speaker interests at stake in compelling
individuals to speak.
Even if one assumes that at the extreme, government
compulsion of an overtly normative message is problematic with
respect to commercial as well as noncommercial speakers, one
might still want to distinguish between implicitly and overtly
normative compulsions. Consider the analogy to the exclusion of
false and misleading commercial speech from the protection of
the First Amendment. Rebecca Tushnet has pointed out that the
exclusion of not just "false" but also "misleading" commercial
speech from First Amendment scrutiny is integral to consumer
protection goals because of the difficulty in drawing a bright line
between the two. 1 2 2 Similarly here, the difficulty in strictly
separating purely factual commercial compelled speech from

n9

Id at 258.

See id at 257 ("Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that
published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute,
editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under
the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or
reduced.").
121 See text accompanying note 91.
122 See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of "False"Is:
Falsity and
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 Loyola LA L Rev 227, 248-54 (2007).
120
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implicitly normative commercial compelled speech means that
policing the line between the two may undermine legitimate
consumer protection interests. 123 By analogy to the line between
misleading and truthful commercial speech then, we might
distinguish between direct government advocacy of a normative
viewpoint, which could be subject to heightened scrutiny, and
normative viewpoints that are implicit in governmentally
compelled factual disclosure, which should not be subject to
heightened scrutiny.124 Such a view would continue to place
almost any conceivable privacy super-notice, which is far less
likely than a cigarette label to involve any overtly normative
claims, beyond the reach of the First Amendment.
II. DATA PROCESSING AND THE PROBLEM OF SPEECH AMONG
COMMERCIAL ENTITIES

Even perfect notice may be at best a partial solution to the
consumer privacy problem. There are deeper issues with noticeand-choice, such as the impossibility of conveying the full
complexity of information flows, cognitive biases that make it
difficult for consumers to weigh the long-term effects of their
choices, and the failure of individual choices to account for
overall social impacts.125 As a result, beyond improved notice,
some scholars have also called for some role for "[m]ore
substantive rules about data collection, use, and disclosure,"
which "could consist of hard boundaries that block particularly
troublesome practices as well as softer default rules that can be
bargained around." 126
Such rules, however, could be challenged on First
Amendment grounds, particularly following the Supreme
Court's decision in Sorrell v IMS Health Inc.127 In Sorrell, the
Supreme Court struck down a Vermont statute that prohibited
the sale, transfer, or use of information about individual
physicians' prescriptions for marketing purposes without the

See Part I.B.
The dissenting judge in R.J. Reynolds seems to have taken this perspective,
distinguishing between the permissible use of graphic images to reinforce the textual
warnings and the potentially impermissible use of the phone number 1-800-QUIT-NOW.
See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F3d at 1234 (Rogers dissenting).
125 See Solove, 126 Harv L Rev at 1885-93 (cited in note 15).
126 Id at
1903.
127 131 S Ct 2653
(2011).
123

124
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prescriber's consent.128 In its decision, the Court broadly
suggested, albeit in dictum, that it was prepared to impose
heightened scrutiny on any restriction on "the creation and
dissemination of information," such as the restrictions on the
"sales, transfer, and use of prescriber-identifying information" at
issue in the case. 129 Although the Court ultimately resolved the
case on different First Amendment grounds,130 some have read
this language in Sorrell to suggest that the Court would subject
all privacy laws-which, after all, restrict "the creation and
dissemination of information"-to heightened scrutiny, perhaps
even strict scrutiny, under the First Amendment.131
Whatever the implications of Sorrell for privacy law
generally, restrictions on consumer data processing by
commercial entities should generally fall outside of First
Amendment heightened scrutiny. Again, the key fact is that
such restrictions are imposed on transactions among commercial
entities. That commerciality distinguishes such a restriction
from a similar one imposed on individuals. The paradigmatic
form of commercial speech, the commercial advertisement, is
protected under the First Amendment in order to protect the
interests of the consumers, the noncommercial listeners.132
When one commercial data collector or broker transmits
consumer data to another, there is no such noncommercial
listener to protect, and the basis for including such a transaction
within the ambit of the First Amendment is absent.
Language from the Supreme Court's commercial speech
cases supports the view that the Court had noncommercial
listeners in mind in protecting commercial speech under the
First Amendment. For example, in Virginia State Board of

Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc,133 the
Court framed the question as follows: "What is at issue is
"s Id at 2659-60. This information is called "prescriber-identifying information." Id.
129 Id at 2666-67.

'30 The Court held that the Vermont statute impermissibly disfavored certain
speakers, namely, the detailers who market brand-name drugs to physicians, by
withholding from only those speakers the prescription data at issue. Id at 2667.
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing,and the Death
'a'
of Privacy, 36 Vt L Rev 855, 868-74 (2012). See also Agatha M. Cole, Internet Advertising
After Sorrell v. IMS Health: A Discussion on Data Privacy & the First Amendment, 30
Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 283, 304-05 (2012) (describing commentators who
"hypothesiz[ed] that the [Sorrell] ruling would preempt forthcoming privacy legislation").
132 See note 86 and accompanying
text.
133 425 US 748 (1976).
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whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity,
fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its
recipients."1 34 Such an anti-paternalism rationale presumes an
intrinsic value in letting "people .. . perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed," 135 a value that
would seem to attach only to people, not commercial entities.
Similarly, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service
Commission of New York 36 characterized the value of
commercial speech as that it "accurately inform[s] the public,"l 37
again suggesting that it is the public at large that the Court
envisioned as the recipients of protected commercial speech.
Commercial data brokerage may inform, but such transactions
do not inform "people" or "the public," and thus fall outside the
transactions envisioned in the commercial speech cases.
Neil Richards has previously argued that regulation of data
processing should be regarded as regulation of commercial
activity outside of the purview of the First Amendment.138 In
particular, Richards finds "trade in personal data" to be "far
removed from the core speech protected by the First
Amendment" and "much more like the 'speech' outside the
boundaries of heightened review."139 Richards points out the
wide variety of "speech" restrictions that have long existed
without any First Amendment scrutiny, such as laws
prohibiting "an insider trading tip, a false statement in a proxy
statement, an offer to create a monopoly in restraint of trade, or
a breach of the attorney-client privilege."140 Many of those
examples, however, might be distinguished from data processing
as involving performative speech, false speech, or speech within
a special relationship, none of which characterizes data
processing. Focusing on the commercial status of the entities
involved helps more fully to explain why the view of commercial

'34
135
136
137

Id at 773 (emphasis added).
Id at 770.
447 US 557 (1980).
Id at 563.

"as See generally Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First
Amendment, 52 UCLA L Rev 1149 (2005).
1
Id at 1206.
140

Id at 1172-73.
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data processing as mere commercial activity is correct, and why
it can be regulated without satisfying heightened scrutiny.
The Sorrell Court cited three cases in support of its claim
that "the creation and dissemination of information are speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment," but none of them
support the view that transactions among commercial entities
deserve First Amendment protection. 14 1 One such case involved
the disclosure of an illegally intercepted cell phone conversation
by the person who intercepted the call to other individuals and
to the media, and the subsequent broadcasts of the recording by
the media to the public at large. 142 Another cited case involved
"information on beer labels" on cans of beer sold to the public.143
Both of those cases involved individuals as listeners.
Only the third case cited by the Sorrell Court potentially
involved a transaction among commercial entities. That case,

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc v Greenmoss Builders, Inc,144 concerned

whether a credit reporting agency could be liable in a libel action
for presumed and punitive damages in the absence of actual
malice.1 45 It is not clear who received the particular defamatory
credit report at issue in the case,1 46 but the recipients were
"usually creditors of the reported enterprises" 14 7 and thus
arguably commercial entities. 148 Nevertheless, any member of
the public likely could have paid for access to this information,
so it was at least theoretically possible that there would be
noncommercial listeners.14 9
Sorrell, 131 S Ct at 2667, citing Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514, 527 (2001),
Rubin v Coors Brewing Co, 514 US 476, 481 (1995), and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc v
Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 472 US 749, 759 (1985) (plurality opinion).
142 See Bartnicki, 532 US at 525. Both the individual and media defendants in this
case "played no part in the illegal interception" and "their access to the information on
the tapes was obtained lawfully." Id.
141

14s

See Rubin, 514 US at 481.

144 472 US 749 (1985).
145 Id at 752-53 (plurality opinion).

146 See id at 751-52 (noting that the credit reporting agency refused to divulge this
information).
147 Greenmoss Builders, Inc v Dun & Bradstreet,Inc, 461 A2d 414, 416 (Vt 1983).
14s See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 US at 762 ("[The credit report] was speech solely in
the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience.") (emphasis
added).
"9 See id at 782 n 6 (Brennan dissenting) ("Like an account of judicial proceedings
in a newspaper, magazine, or news broadcast, a statement in petitioner's reports that a
particular company has filed for bankruptcy is a report of a timely news event conveyed
to members of the public by a business organized to collect and disseminate such

691

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIVACY REGULATION

93

More importantly, the fractured Court ultimately decided
that the First Amendment imposed no impediment to the forms
of liability at issue in the case.15 0 Along the way, the plurality
opinion did not merely find that a First Amendment interest
was outweighed; it found that interest to be quite weak.15 1 The
plurality opinion also applied a balancing test that bears little
resemblance even to intermediate scrutiny, let alone strict
scrutiny. 152 That the opinion recognized any First Amendment
interest at all may have been because it framed the issue as one
of the weight to be given to "speech on matters of purely private
concern." 153 Since such matters can also be communicated
privately among individuals, the Court could hardly have found
such communications to be entirely without First Amendment
value. In any event, Dun & Bradstreet fails to support a broad
claim of First Amendment value in the dissemination of data
among commercial entities. Transactions among commercial
entities do not raise the interests that are protected by
heightened scrutiny of commercial speech restrictions, and thus,
such scrutiny should not apply to regulation of data processing
among commercial entities.
III. CONCLUSION

Some privacy super-notice strategies or restrictions on data
processing might be more wise or effective than others. Perhaps
it will be impossible to ever make privacy notices as concrete
and attention-grabbing as graphical cigarette warnings.154
Perhaps new forms of notice will quickly become routine and
lose their impact. Perhaps it would be ultimately detrimental to
society if substantive restrictions on data processing
undermined the business models that support many online
services.155

information.").
150
See id at 763 (plurality opinion); id at 764 (Burger concurring in the judgment); id
at 774 (White concurring in the judgment).
't" See id at 759 (plurality) ("[T]he role of the Constitution in regulating state libel
law is far more limited when the concerns that activated New York Times and Gertz are
absent.").
152
See Dun & Bradstreet,472 US at 757 (plurality opinion).
153
Id at 759.
1"

'

See Solove, 126 Harv L Rev at 1885 (cited in note 15).
Id at 1896.
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Even if these types of privacy regulations might fail, they
should be given the opportunity to do so. Because they either
compel speech from commercial entities or regulate transactions
among commercial entities, they do not raise the First
Amendment concerns that are raised by similar rules imposed
on individuals or by restrictions on commercial advertising.
They should therefore not be subject to heightened scrutiny. The
problems of privacy regulation are difficult enough without
throwing unwarranted constitutional constraints into the mix.

